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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 186 
Accident time: 06:20 Accident Date: 22/03/1999 
Where it occurred: Kapfudze Village, 
Mukumbura 
Country: Zimbabwe 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: KMS 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: R2M2 AP blast Ground condition: not applicable 
Date record created: 14/02/2004 Date  last modified: 14/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
An internal accident report was written by the demining group's safety officer and the QA 
team and made available. The following summarises its content.  
The investigators stated that the accident occurred at 06:20 as the men were preparing to 
start work. Supposedly free-from-explosive R2M2 mines were placed on the dashboard of a 
truck used to transport equipment and personnel. The mines still retained their stab-sensitive 
detonators and were used as test pieces for calibrating detectors. [The small detonator is the 
largest metallic signature in the mine.] 
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The report stated that at the time of the accident there were three team leaders and the driver 
in the cab and an unspecified number of deminers in the back. On arriving at the site the 
driver inquired about the mines and subsequently pressed the top of one as it was being held 
by a Team Leader, making the detonator explode. The victim sustained an injury to the flesh 
of the mid-finger of his right hand. [However, the victim was the driver and as the blast 
emanated from the bottom of the mine it seems likely that he held it in his own hand.] 
The Supervisor stated that the driver placed his hand on the top of the mine and it shattered 
as the detonator functioned. He stated that he doctor was called at 07:02, and maintained that 
the mines were normally carried in his vehicle in a locked container. 
One Team Leader stated that there were two mines in the vehicle and that they were being 
held by a colleague. 
Another Team Leader stated that he was sitting next to the driver and holding two mines 
when the driver asked him how the mines functioned. On explaining that you had to apply 
force to the top, the driver suddenly reached out and pressed down on the mine. 
Another Team Leader stated that he had disembarked when the explosion occurred. 
The driver stated that the mines were on the dashboard and that when he was reversing the 




The investigators concluded that the nature of the injury and the lack of damage to the 
dashboard disproved the driver's statement. They said that the supervisor and the three 
Team Leaders were negligent in allowing the mines to be transported by any other means 
than in the senior Supervisor's vehicle. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that the senior Supervisor should always ensure that 
anything of an explosive nature is transported in his vehicle to and from the site. Also that the 
senior Supervisor must ensure that Team Leaders obey safety regulations, and that the use 
of mines as test-pieces should cease. They added that truck and ambulance drivers should 
not carry explosive items without following proper transportation procedures. 
The Safety Officer stated that the victim received minor lacerations to the "mid-finger" of his 
right hand, with no bones broken. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 236 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: driver  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: none 








The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because 
safety procedures were breached by field management with the knowledge of their senior 
Supervisor. The demining group management acknowledged this with their censure of the 
Supervisor and so took all reasonable measures to prevent a repetition. The secondary cause 
is listed as a “Field control inadequacy”. 
 
Related papers 
A "First Written Warning", dated 24th March 1999, addressed to the senior Supervisor was on 
file. It stated that he "caused" the accident because he failed to control the use of the test 
mine. 
An internal "Accident Investigating Form", undated, signed by the Safety Officer, included the 
observation that there was negligence on the part of the Supervisor and three of his Team 
Leaders.  
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